Zoning Obscenity: Or, the Moral Politics of Porn by Marcus, Norman
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 27 Number 1 Article 3 
12-1-1977 
Zoning Obscenity: Or, the Moral Politics of Porn 
Norman Marcus 
New York City Planning Commission 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, Land Use Law Commons, and 
the Property Law and Real Estate Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Norman Marcus, Zoning Obscenity: Or, the Moral Politics of Porn, 27 Buff. L. Rev. 1 (1977). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol27/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at 
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
ZONING OBSCENITY: OR, THE MORAL POLITICS OF PORN
NORMAN MARCUS*
INTRODUCTION
The last decade has climaxed a trend, burgeoning since the Sec-
ond World War, which has thrust pornographic land uses into the
midst of our major cities. The closet doors containing "stag films" and
"dirty books" and the semi-legal clubs and bars featuring explicit sex-
ual entertainment have opened wide. It has been suggested by some
that the commercial pornography explosion "proves that a nation gets
the kind of art and entertainment it wants and is willing to pay for
.... ,"' But in recent years a growing recognition of the inability of
judges to distinguish what is obscene from what is not,2 as well as con-
siderable public indignation at the growth of pornographic land uses3
and their adverse impact on surrounding land values, have led to at-
tempts to regulate pornography through restrictive zoning.4 Such at-
tempts raise the thorny political, moral and legal questions5 that are
explored in this article.
This article first traces the consequences of the proliferation of
pornographic land uses in Boston, Detroit and New York City as ex-
amples of the national trend, and analyzes the two basic alternatives
for attacking the problem: creation of a "red light" district and anti-
*Counsel, New York City Planning Commission; Adjunct Associate Professor,
New York University Law School; B.A., Columbia College, 1953; LL.B., Yale University,
1957.
The Author is indebted to Frederick Zauderer, an attorney in the Counsel's Office
of the New York City Planning Commission, for many of the legislative ideas described
herein, and to Harry Heching and David Shapiro for their helpful research in connec-
tion with the preparation of this article. The author takes full responsibility for the
article's point of view, which is not necessarily that of the New York City Planning
Commission.
1. Fahringer and Brown, The Rise and Fall of Roth-A Critique of Recent Su-
preme Court Obscenity Decisions, 62 Ky. L.J. 731, 766-67 (1974).
2. See notes 97-138 & accompanying text infra.
3. U.S. NEws AND WoRLD REPORT, Sept. 13, 1976, at 75-76; TIME, April 5, 1976,
at 58-63.
4. E.g., DETROIT, MICN., ZONING ORDINANCE §§ #32.0007, #62.0000, #66.0103
(eff. Nov. 2, 1972). New York City proposed a similar ordinance which is discussed at
length in this article. See text accompanying notes 45-96 infra.
5. Lerner, Some Sexual Plagues, N.Y. Post, Dec. 6, 1976, at 43, col. 1.
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concentration zoning aimed at dispersal of pornographic land uses.0
After a brief review of Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,1 where
the Supreme Court upheld Detroit's dispersal ordinance, the article
presents a brief history of New York City's unsuccessful attempt to
adopt a similar ordinance tailored to its own land use patterns.
What follows is an attempt to elucidate the legal climate within
which pornography flourishes and withers by examining the post-World
War II Supreme Court "obscenity" decisions, which, following the War-
ren Court's increasing emphasis of first amendment rights, exhibit a
trend toward containment of these rights. The Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Young is shown to be part of this containment policy and is ex-
amined with a view toward predicting the Court's likely response to
variations on the Detroit scheme such as those proposed unsuccessfully
by the New York City Planning Commission in 1977. Among the varia-
tions considered is the amortization of nonconforming pornographic
land uses on traditional zoning grounds. The roles of public and pri-
vate nuisance actions are also briefly examined.
The article concludes with an evaluation of the future potential
of zoning pornography, which the Burger Court has apparently sanc-
tioned in an effort to replenish the "obscenity" concept partially ex-
hausted by the Warren Court. Young's implications for further zoning
incursions into the area of first amendment guarantees is assessed, and
some reflections are offered on the affinity between zoning and moral-
ity, suggesting a way to resolve the contradiction inherent in entrusting
interpretation of first amendment rights to local zoning authorities.
Throughout this article particular attention is paid to the New York
City experience.
I. THE RISE OF PORNOGRAPHY AND MUNICIPAL ATTEMPTS
TO REGULATE IT: A TALE OF THREE CITIES
A. Boston and Its "Combat Zone"
Through an urban renewal program in the late 1950's, Boston
cleared the Scollay Square area of its adult use concentrations and
transformed it into something of a new civic center. Unlike Detroit,
Boston made no attempt to prevent reconcentration of adult uses.8
6. Baker, No Biz Like Sex Biz, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1976, at 37, col. 5 (offers
a sophisticated parody of these alternatives).
7. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
8. New York City, New York, Mayor's Office of Midtown Manhattan Planning and
[Vol. 27
ZONING OBSCENITY
By the mid-60's, a new area of concentration began forming; topless
bars and cabarets, adult movie theatres, pinball parlors, and adult
bookstores proliferated in the lower Washington Street area near the
central business district, an area popularly designated the "Combat
Zone."'' Over a decade, the Combat Zone quite unaccidentally became
the center for all but a handful of adult uses in the Boston area.'0
In an effort to keep these uses from spreading to other vulnerable
areas, Boston shed its puritanical image and amended its zoning ordi-
nance to establish the Combat Zone" formally as "the most logical
place" for a designated adult use district; "adult use" became a dis-
tinct and apparently readily regulated land use. By regulating rather
than eradicating adult uses, Boston sought to contain them in a small,
specially-designated area of the city. It was expected that Boston could
more readily police these contained uses and substantially prevent them
from having a blighting effect on the rest of the city. In addition, the
Combat Zone could be easily avoided by those wishing to have no con-
tact with pornographic establishments. Boston banned or made condi-
tional the establishment of adult uses which excluded minors every-
where in the city except in the business-entertainment district ("Adult
Entertainment District").12
The effect of this zoning designation, while achieving the goal of
containment, was to create more serious abuses and to exacerbate al-
ready-existing enforcement problems in the district.13 Prior to the zon-
ing amendment, illegal activities such as prostitution, gambling, and
the showing of "hard-core" films and books were carried on discreetly.
The designation of the area by the city as the "Adult Entertainment
District", however, assured the final disintegration of the semblance
of law-and-order in the Combat Zone. Perpetrators of crimes sensed a
certain immunity from law enforcement and the rest of the populace
experienced a feeling of helplessness against the threat of criminal ac-
Development, Draft Report on Adult Use Zoning, ch. V, at 2 (Oct. 16, 1976) [hereinafter
cited as Midtown Report] (A copy of this report is on file with the Counsel's Office of
the New York City Planning Commission). All factual references to the growth of por-
nography in Detroit, Boston and New York in the text of the article are taken from this
report.
9. The Combat Zone consisted of a two-block area bounded by the retail core on
the north, the Chinatown residential area on the east, the Tufts & New England Medical
Center complex on the south, and the Boston Common/Park Square development on the
,vest and northwest. Midtown Report, supra note 8, ch. V, at 1.
10. Midtown Report, supra note 8, ch. V, at 1.
11. BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS, ZONING CODE, text amendment no. 38 (1974).
12. Midtown Report, supra note 8, ch. V, at 3.
13. N.Y. Post, Nov. 30, 1976, at 1, col. 4; Midtown Report, supra note 8, ch. III,
at 3, to ch. V, at 3.
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tivity in the district. This sense of criminal license effectively under-
mined the planning goals of the zoning amendment, which had in-
cluded some cosmetic attempts at urban design. The December, 1976
fatal stabbing, in the Combat Zone, of a Harvard University football
player who had argued with prostitutes over an alleged pickpocketing,
and the murder in the summer of 1977 of a 17-year old suburban girl
last seen soliciting in a Combat Zone bar, among other incidents, have
caused sober second thoughts regarding the wisdom of singling out one
special commercial sex district in a large urban metropolis. 14
B. Detroit's Dispersal Plan Receives Supreme Court Approval
During the bulldozing of its skid-row district in 1962, the City of
Detroit enacted a zoning ordinance that placed locational restrictions
and concentration limits on certain land uses ordinarily found in run-
down areas.15 By its action, Detroit hoped to prevent a re-concentration
of those uses that had stimulated the growth of a skid-row, and which
had been forced out of the area by urban renewal.
Detroit's plan was initially successful. In the early 1970's, how-
ever, the number of adult entertainment uses began to increase. In
1969, Detroit had only two adult bookstores, two adult movie theatres,
and two topless bars. By 1972, there were well over one hundred adult
entertainment uses in existence. 16
After Detroit's 1962 locational restrictions were working effec-
tively, the city amended them in 1972 to include regulation of adult
entertainment establishments.17 The inclusion of adult bookstores,
adult motion picture theatres and adult mini-theatres within the lo-
cational and anti-concentration criteria of an anti-skid row zoning ordi-
nance was challenged by operators of two adult motion picture theatres
in Young.'8
The 1972 amendments sought to disperse the locations of adult
theatres throughout the city. Adult theatres could not, without special
waiver, be located within 1,000 feet of any two other "regulated uses,"
nor within 500 feet of a residential dwelling. "Regulated uses" re-
14. See authorities cited in note 13 supra.
15. DETROIT, MICH., ZONING ORD)INANCE § 742-G (1962). A state's right to re-
quire that particular businesses be located at specified distances from one another has
been approved in a number of zoning cases. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Board of Zoning Ap-
peals, 140 Conn. 65, 98 A.2d 515 (1953); Glackman v. City of Miami Beach, 51 So. 2d
294 (1951).
16. Midtown Report, supra note 8, ch. VI, at 1.
17. Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. at 54.
18. Id. at 58.
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ferred to ten different kinds of establishments, including adult book-
stores, adult movie theatres, adult mini-theatres, certain cabarets, bars,
taxi dance halls, and hotels. Establishments presenting "material dis-
tinguished or characterized by an emphasis on matter depicting ...
'Specified Sexual Activities' or 'Specified Anatomical Areas'" were con-
sidered to be of an adult character.19
The city's regulation of adult entertainment establishments was
upheld in part in the federal district court"° and subsequently struck
down by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.2 ' The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to review the case22 and on June 24, 1976
overturned the Sixth Circuit's decision.2 In a 5-4 decision, the Court
sustained Detroit's application of its zoning ordinance to movie the-
aters, bookstores, and peep shows featuring pornography. Erotic con-
tent of expression was found to be a valid basis for creating a zoning
classification restricting the location of such uses.
Justice Stevens' plurality opinion 24 rested primarily on the view
that "it is manifest that society's interest in protecting this type of ex-
pression [erotic materials] is of a wholly different, and lesser, magni-
tude than the interest in untrammeled political debate that inspired
Voltaire's immortal comment."215 After carefully noting the absence of
any impact on the operation of existing establishments, Justice Stevens
found the ordinance's regulatory burden on First Amendment rights
19. Id. at 53.
20. Nortown Theatre Inc. v. Gribbs, 373 F. Supp. 363 (E.D. Mich. 1974). The
District Court held invalid the original 500-ft. restriction which was measured from
any building containing "a residential dwelling or rooming unit." Id. at 369-70. Subse-
quently, Detroit amended its ordinance to prohibit adult theaters, within 500 feet of a
residential zone. This amendment was not before the Supreme Court in Young. Young
v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. at 52 n.2.
21. American Mini Theatres, Inc. v. Gribbs, 518 F.2d 1014 (6th Cir. 1975), rev'd,
423 U.S. 911 (1975).
22. Gribbs v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 423 U.S. 911 (1975).
23. 427 U.S. 50.
24. Justice Stevens' opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White
and Rehnquist. justice Powell filed a separate concurring opinion. Id. at 73.
25. Id. at 70. Justice Stevens continued:
Whether political oratory or philosophical discussion moves us to applaud or to
despise what is said, every schoolchild can understand why our duty to defend
the right to speak remains the same. But few of us would march our sons and
daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right to see "Specified Sexual
Activities" exhibited in the theatres of our choice. Even though the First
Amendment protects communication in this area from total suppression, we hold
that the State may legitimately use the content of these materials as the basis for




to erotic speech to be "slight. '26 Showing great deference to "the city's
interest in attempting to preserve the quality of urban life, ' 27 Justice
Stevens concluded that "the city must be allowed a reasonable oppor-
tunity to experiment with solutions to admittedly serious problems."28
Justice Stevens rejected the plaintiffs' attack on the ordinances as
being unconstitutionally vague in defining "adult motion picture
theatre" as "an enclosed building used for . . . presenting material
distinguished or characterized by an emphasis on matter depicting, de-
.scribing or relating to, specified sexual activities or specified anatomi-
cal areas." 29 Finding that plaintiffs' cinema operations were not border-
line but "unquestionably" 30 subject to the Detroit ordinance, Justice
Stevens refused to allow plaintiffs standing to raise the vagueness claim:
Since there is surely a less vital interest in the uninhibited exhibition
of material that is on the borderline between pornography and artistic
expression than in the free dissemination of ideas of social and politi-
cal significance, and since the limited amount of uncertainty in the
ordinances is easily susceptible of a narrowing construction, we think
this is an inappropriate case in which to adjudicate the hypothetical
claims of persons not before the Court.3l
Justice Powell's concurrence rejected Justice Stevens' notion that
"nonobscene, erotic materials may be treated differently under First
Amendment principles from other forms of protected expression."3 2
Instead, after "a careful inquiry into the competing concerns of the
State and the interests protected by the guaranty of free expression,"
he boldly predicated his support of the Detroit ordinance on the pri-
mary importance of the local zoning power.3 3 Under Justice Powell's
approach, both the significance of the police power objective and the
degree of interference with speech are weighed. Finding that "the in-
terests furthered by this ordinance are both important and substan-
tial"-34 and that its "impact on -these [speech] interests is incidental and
26. Id. at 71-72 n. 35. Justice Stevens continued: "There are myriad locations in
the City of Detroit which must be over 1000 ft. from existing regulated establishments."
Id. (quoting district court opinion, 373 F. Supp. 363, 370 (E.D. Mich. 1974)).
27. Id. at 71.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 53 n.5. (emphasis added).
30. Id. at 59.
31. Id. at 61. Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion takes the plurality opinion to
task on this point. Id. at 96.
32. Id. at 73 n.1.
33. Id. at 76.
34. Id. at 80. Justice Powell continued:
Without stable neighborhoods, both residential and commercial, large sections
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minimal," 35 Justice Powell concluded that "[t]he Detroit zoning ordi-
nance . .. affects expression only incidentally, and in furtherance of
governmental interests wholly unrelated to the regulation of expres-
sion."3 6
If one reads the plurality and concurring opinions together, it be-
comes clear that a majority of the Court has subjected the Detroit zon-
ing regulations to the close scrutiny test-weighing the compelling
state interest in quality of life against the fundamental individual right
guaranteed by the first amendment-a test not normally applied to
social and economic legislation.37 A minimal scrutiny test was used, for
example, in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas38 where a restrictive zon-
ing definition of "family" was challenged as a violation of the four-
teenth amendment's equal protection clause. Even though Young found
that a zoning prohibition of the location of adult motion picture the-
atres within 1,000 feet of two other regulated adult uses does. not vio-
late either the first amendment or the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment, its use of the close scrutiny test signalled a
of a modem city quickly can deteriorate into an urban jungle with tragic
consequences to social, environmental, and economic values. While I agree
with respondents that no aspect of the police power enjoys immunity from
searching constitutional scrutiny, it also is undeniable that zoning, when used
to preserve the character of specific areas of a city, is perhaps "the most
essential function performed by local government, for it is one of the primary
means by which we protect that sometimes difficult to define concept of quality
of life."
Id. (quoting Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 13 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) ).
35. Id. at 78. Justice Powell continued:
Detroit has silenced no message, has invoked no censorship, and has imposed
no limitation upon those who wish to view them. The ordinance is addressed
only to the places at which this type of expression may be presented, a restric-
tion that does not interfere with content. Nor is there any significant overall
curtailment of adult movie presentations, or the opportunity for a message to
reach an audience. On the basis of the Detroit Court's finding, . . . it appears
that if sufficient market exists to support them the number of adult movie
theaters in Detroit will remain approximately the same, free to purvey the same
message. To be sure some prospective patrons may be inconvenienced by this
dispersal. But other patrons, depending upon where they live or work, may find
it more convenient to view an adult movie when adult theaters are not concen-
trated in a particular section of the city.
Id. at 78-79 (footnotes omitted).
36. Id. at 84.
37. See text accompanying notes 166-85 infra. A presumption of validity has
generally attached to zoning regulations following Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Zoning regulations if found rational, non-discriminatory and
non-confiscatory, have been upheld against 14th amendment challenge without applica-
tion of the "close scrutiny" test.
38. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). See L. TRBE, AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 15-18, at 975 (1978).
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cautionary "flashing amber" at best, rather than the "green light"
sought by local political interests anxious to bring these uses under
control.
Detroit has apparently had significant success in meeting its goals
through its amended ordinance. Since 1972, when the ordinance was
passed, there has been an increase of only 10 adult entertainment uses
in the City. Of these 10, five were bookstores, three were topless bars
and two were movie theaters. Now that its ordinance has been ap-
proved by the Court, Detroit has moved to close the five bookstores
and two movie theatres which did not locate in compliance with the
ordinance. The three new topless bars located either in compliance
with the ordinance or through the neighborhood waiver provision 0
and therefore are legal uses. The Detroit Law Department credits the
ordinance with these rather enviable results. 40
C. New York City-The Impact of Pornography
In 1965, there were a total of nine "adult uses" in New York City:
four adults-only movie theatres, three adults-only bookstores, and two
bars featuring "go-go" dancers.41 All were located in the general Times
Square/Theatre District area. Peep shows were non-existent. Massage
parlors in their present advertised form were unknown, although one
may presume the existence of discreet houses of prostitution in and
around the City. In 1976, however, there were a total of 245 adult uses
in the City, including 62 adult theatres (43 in Manhattan), 93 mas-
sage parlors, and over 62 bookstores and peep shows or combinations.4 2
Moreover, such uses not only increased in number, but spread from
their original concentration in the Times Square/Theatre District area
to other parts of Manhattan, including East Midtown/Lexington Ave-
nue, East 14th Street, City Hall/Wall Street, and Downtown Brooklyn.
No decisions to make major capital investments (i.e., new office
39. The ordinance authorizes the Zoning Commission to waive the 1,000-foot
restriction if it finds:
a) That the proposed use will not be contrary to the public interest or injurious
to nearby properties, and that the spirit and intent of this Ordinance will be
observed. b) That the proposed use will not enlarge or encourage the develop-
ment of a "skid row" area. c) That the establishment of an additional regulated
use in the area will not be contrary to any program of neigh[bor]hood conserva-
tion nor will it interfere with any program of urban renewal. d) That all
applicable regulations of this Ordinance will be observed.
427 U.S. at 54, n.7.
40. Midtown Report, supra note 8, ch. VI, at 3.
41. Id., ch. I, at 1.
42. Id., ch. I, at 1-2.
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buildings) in the Times Square/Theatre District area have been made
since 1965. Although other factors such as high local taxes, high labor
costs, and high energy costs undoubtedly played a major role in deci-
sions not to invest in this area, located just west of Manhattan's midtown
central business district, the negative image created by the increasing
concentration of adult entertainment uses did nothing to counteract
these economic indicators. Large numbers of noisy groups, peddlers,
handbillers, and garish sexplicit advertising on the streets tended to
clash with headquarters buildings, office users, and tourist visitors in
search of the area's legitimate theatres, restaurants, and shops.4 3 At the
same time that adult entertainment uses were proliferating, economic
decline occurred on West 42nd Street. For example, the ratio of tax
arrears to tax assessment for the Times Square/Theatre District area
was 2 times greater than for all of Midtown in 1975. In 1972 it had
been only twice as great.44
These collective problems led to a 1975 proposal to sharply re-
strict the location of "physical culture establishments" (massage par-
lors) in the Times Square area and to amortize non-conforming facili-
ties within one year. The proposal was adopted by the City and be-
came part of its zoning resolution. 45 Its amortization features have been
uniformly sustained by the courts.4 6
43. Public hearings revealed that the former manager of the Royal Manhattan
Hotel attributed that hotel's difficulties and eventual closing to the deterioration of
Eighth Avenue which was brought about by the great increase in numbers of physical
culture establishments located there. Several businessmen formerly located in either
the Theatre or Clinton districts indicated that they were forced to relocate when a
physical culture establishment moved into an adjacent store. An advertising agency
representative testified that recruitment of personnel to work in this area was very diffi-
cult and that the rate of job turnover had become very high because of the abundance
of adult uses located in the area. Residents of Clinton, an adjacent residential com-
munity, described dense sidewalk "streetwalkers" solicitation emanating from the nearby
physical culture establishments, which was incompatible with residential living and the
presence in the community of numerous public and parochial schools. N.Y. City Plan-
ning Commission Report CP-23116, cal. no. 22 (Dec. 10, 1975) (adopted by Board of
Estimate on Jan. 8, 1976 (Cal. No. 83)). The report is on file at the N.Y. City
Planning Commission. See Midtown Report, supra note 8, ch. II, at 3, 5-6.
44. Other economic indicators also illustrate Times Square's decline. During the
period of 1972-1975, tax arrears on West 42nd Street increased 167%. This compared
unfavorably with the overall increase for all of midtown of 141%. From 1971 through
1973, sales tax revenue from the Theatre District dropped 43%, while city-wide sales
tax revenue increased 11%. The Theatre District also experienced a 5% decrease in
retail jobs during this period, as opposed to a city-wide loss of 2%. Midtown Report,
supra note 8, ch. II, at 3-4.
45. Naw YORK CITY, Nxw YORK, ZONING REsOLUTION, Special Theatre District
§ 81-021, Special Clinton District § 96-524.
46. See Walsh v. Anmark Enterprises, Inc., N.Y.L.J., Dec. 5, 1977, at 10, col. 5,
and cases cited therein.
1978]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
It came as no surprise that legitimate commercial and residential
Times Square interests hailed Young, which they claimed gave local
government a zoning green light47 to apply traditional incompatible
use classifications to deal with the problem of adult motion picture
theatres, adult bookstores, peep shows and topless bars.
D. New York City's Attempt to Control Pornography
Whatever the color of the traffic light, Young did signal that adult
use regulation experiments would be seriously entertained, at the pos-
sible expense of first amendment freedoms. After almost two decades
of frustration with the Court's libertarian decisions narrowly confining
the objective of obscenity prosecution, 48 city halls now, at last, had a
promising means of controlling pornography. To the extent that adult
cinemas and bookstores purvey obscene as well as constitutionally pro-
tected material, the zoning approach provides means of controlling
such material in addition to the regulation of obscenity.
The closeness of the Young decision and the majority's use of a
close scrutiny test,49 however, led city planners to proceed with cau-
tion in adopting the Detroit techniques to differing land use patterns.80
A delicate balance had to be struck between community land use pres-
sures and civil libertarian concerns. Owing largely to the difficulties of
satisfying such competing interests while maintaining respect for the
Court's cloudy strictures against interference with first amendment
rights, New York City in the spring of 1977 stumbled into an inextri-
cable political morass from which legislative enactment of adult use
zoning controls proved impossible. A description of the political pit-
falls along the seemingly inviting route sanctioned by the Court in
Young may prove instructive to the uninitiated. It all began 'inno-
cently enough ....
After the Young decision, Mayor Beame's Midtown Manhattan
Action Office together with the Department of City Planning prepared
zoning recommendations to deconcentrate and limit adult uses based
on a comprehensive study of land use patterns in New York City.
47. Previous analysis of Young demonstrates that the Court'es decision, by stressing
a close scrutiny approach, has signalled a "flashing amber" rather than a "green"
light. See text accompanying notes 25-38 supra.
48. See notes 97-138 and accompanying text infra.
49. See text accompanying notes 36-38 supra.
50. Appendix B lists the major cities across the country which have adopted and
rejected adult use ordinances and characterizes the alternative chosen-e.g., Detroit-
type ordinance or Boston "combat zone" type.
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Their legislative form was closely patterned on the Detroit mQdel. 1
For analytical purposes, the legislation can be broken down into five
components: (1) definition of adult uses, (2) location requirements,
(3) anti-concentration formulae, (4) amortization of non-conforming
uses, and (5) exemption or variance criteria and procedures therefor.
A description and discussion of these components follows.
(1) Definition of adult uses: Five categories of adult use were
defined: adult bookstore, adult motion picture theatre, adult coin-
operated entertainment facility (peep show), adult "topless" entertain-
ment establishment (topless bar), and adult physical culture establish-
ment (massage parlor).52 The first four categories presumptively fell
within the protection of the first amendment 53 and were accordingly
defined in a manner closely following that adopted by Detroit and im-
pliedly sanctioned by the Young decision. These uses were defined as
having their primary or predominant 54 activity distinguished or char-
acterized by an emphasis on "specified sexual areas" or "specified sex-
ual activities." The specified areas or activities were in turn defined as
in the Detroit ordinance and referred to sexual parts of the human
anatomy in various states of arousal 55 The fifth category of adult use
was defined as an establishment which offered massage or body rubs
by members of the opposite sex. Such establishments enjoy no first
amendment protection 56 and were to be prohibited on a nuisance ra-
51. N.Y. City Planning Comm'n, Report N 760137 ZRY, cal. no. 23, at 11-27
(Jan. 26, 1977).
52. All five categories in their "non-adult" counterparts were found in the pre-
existing zoning resolution classifications of use, e.g., motion picture theaters, bookstores,
etc.
53. For a discussion of topless bars and the first amendment, see Note, Topless
Dancing and the Constitution: A New York Town's Experience, 25 BUFFALO L. RaV.
753 (1976).
54. The Detroit ordinance used the words "substantial or significant." Young v.
American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. at 53 n.5.
55. These definitions were as follows:
'Specified Sexual Activities' [are]:
1. Human genitals in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal;
2. Acts of human masturbation, sexual intercourse or sodomy;
3. Fondling or other erotic touching of human genitals, pubic region,
buttock or female breast.
'Specified Anatomical Areas' [are]:
1. Less than completely and opaquely covered: (a) human genitals,
pubic region, (b) buttock, and (c) female breast below a point immediately
above the top of the areola; and
2. Human male genitals, in a discernably turgid state, even if completely
and opaquely covered.
Id. at 53 n.4.
56. As recently as 1976, the Supreme Court, in denying certiorari, let stand a lower
court decision upholding a Philadelphia, Pa. ordinance which prohibited a masseur or
1978]
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tionale one year after the legislation's effective date in all districts of
New York City.5 7
(2) Locational requirements: Adult uses were barred from locat-
ing in all zoning districts of the city except for regional and downtown
commercial zones. Regional commercial districts were already mapped
in all five boroughs of the city as a part of its comprehensive zoning
ordinance, 5 and downtown commercial zoning classifications existed
in Manhattan and Brooklyn. Thus, while non-adult cinemas, bars and
bookstores were allowed in all commercial and industrial zones as com-
patible with other commercial or industrial uses therein permitted,
adult uses were restricted on traditional land use grounds to areas
where they would not adversely impact surrounding development. No
adult use was permitted to locate within 500 feet of a residential dis-
trict, even on a site within a regional or downtown commercial zone.59
These restricted locations for adult uses should be contrasted with the
pre-existing zoning ordinance which, being pornography-blind, allowed
adult uses to occupy structures in any commercial or industrially-zoned
area regardless of neighborhood character or proximity to residence.
(3) Anti-concentration formulae: Writhin regional commercial
zones no more than two adult uses -were permitted within 1000 feet
of each other; within downtown commercial zones as many as three
adult uses were permitted within 1,000 feet of each other. The com-
paratively more intensive development of the downtown area followed
from a finding of lesser impact in such areas of high density,00 thus
permitting a somewhat greater concentration. For purposes of measur-
masseuse from treating a person of the opposite sex. Colorado Springs Amusements Ltd.
v. Rizzo, 524 F.2d 571, 576 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 913 (1976). In
that case, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals relied on earlier Supreme Court dismissals
in Smith v. Keator, 419 U.S. 1043 (1974), dismissing appeal from 285 N.C. 530, 206
S.E.2d 203 (1974); Rubenstein v. Town of Cherry Hill, 417 U.S. 963 (1974), dis-
missing appeal from No. 10,027 (N.J. Super. Jan. 29, 1974); and Kisley v. City of
Falls Church, 409 U.S. 907 (1972), dismissing appeal from 212 Va. 693, 187 S.E.2d
168 (1972).
57. The restrictions on massage parlors, see text accompanying note 45 supra,
adopted by the City in 1975 applied only in the Times Square area, while the remainder
of the City was blanketed with a one-year moratorium on new parlors. The proposal
under discussion here affected new and existing parlors in the rest of the city.
58. Most zoning classification systems differentiate and distribute permissible com-
mercial uses among local neighborhood, regional and downtown commercial districts.
Commercial uses are not typically allowed in residential districts.
59. See note 20 supra.
60. In addition to distribution of uses, typical zoning ordinances differentiate among
areas based upon their intensity of use. Thus, bigger buildings will be permitted in down-




ing concentration, each adult use was regarded as a primary use; a
pornography "supermarket" or "department store" containing a cin-
ema screen, a book counter and a peep show machine would therefore
exhaust the concentration quota of three adult uses in a downtown
zone.
(4) Amortization of non-conforming uses: All adult uses within
500 feet of a residential district were required to terininate within one
year.61 The amortization provisions provided further that, beyond 500
feet from a residential district where the concentration of "adult uses"
exceeded the level permitted (two or three uses within 1,000 feet, de-
pending on the commercial district), the number of these uses would
be reduced to the specified concentration level permitted. This meant
that within one year from the date of enactment of this legislation,
those "adult uses" located in an area which is concentrated with "adult
uses" (even though situated more than 500 feet from a residential dis-
trict) would be subject to amortization measured by their proximity
to the residential district. Those "adult uses" closest to the residential
district would be amortized first. The process would continue until the
required level of concentration was reached.
Amortization provisions in zoning ordinances across the United
States have won a fair measure of judicial approval. 2 Under the amor-
tization approach, which has generally been limited to highly obnox-
ious uses, the use is assigned a period of permitted non-conformity
during which time it may continue to exist and function-but at the
expiration of that time, it must terminate.6 3 The rationale for the
61. Detroit had not used this approach.
62. R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 6.64 (2d ed. 1976).
63. Primarily, zoning is a future-oriented method of land-use regulation. The
regulation of pre-existing non-conforming uses has, however, assumed greater importance
as it has become clear that these uses not only refuse to disappear, but frequently
prosper due to their newly-acquired monopolistic position. This problem is particularly
serious where the non-conforming uses are so undesirable, as is the case, for example, with
junkyards and clusters of adult uses, as to defeat the purposes of the overall zoning plan.
Placing restrictions on non-conforming uses is an alternative to eliminating them
entirely via amortization. Such restrictions have included limitations on expansion,
restrictions relating to repair, and prohibition of major alteration. This approach, how-
ever, often causes the non-conforming uses to become even greater blights on the com-
munity because of the various restrictions placed upon those who would undertake
needed improvements.
Summary termination of non-conforming uses is generally not permitted. The courts
have pointed out the serious constitutional problems associated with an attempt to
terminate uses of property summarily, particularly where this would result in severe
economic loss to the property owner. See, e.g., Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 211 Cal.
304, 295 P. 14 (1930).
Perhaps the most equitable, but certainly the most politically controversial, termina-
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amortization doctrine relates to the substantiality of the property own-
er's investment. The greater the invested equity, the longer the period
of amortization required to recapture invested equity and plan for re-
location prior to termination. Critical to the validity of an amortiza-
tion provision is the adequacy of the amortization period, which will
vary depending on the use to be amortized. 4
Non-conforming uses which have typically been candidates for
amortization include outdoor uses, 65 uses where the only buildings em-
ployed are accessory or incidental to such uses (e.g., junkyards),60 and
uses maintained in connection with a conforming building (e.g.,
plumbing business in a one-family house) 7 New York City officials
viewed the theatres, bookstores and bars affected by the proposal as
conforming structures readily adaptable to a myriad of conforming
tenancies once the "adult" occupants vacated their premises. 8
A recent New York court decision 9 sustaining New York City's
earlier one-year amortization requirement for non-conforming physi-
cal culture establishments located within the Times Square area re-
affirmed the basic principles governing the amortization concept: amor-
tization of land that is open or being put to a use of far less economic
consequence than it might be, or amortization of non-conforming uses
of premises that can be put to a conforming use, coupled with the
availability of a reasonable period of time within which to amortize
investment or "loss," will generally assure judicial approval of an amor-
tization provision.
tion technique is the use of the municipal power of eminent domain. A properly de-
signed condemnation program has the advantage of being fair to all parties while it
efficiently and equitably distributes the costs of implementing the zoning ordinance
among the community's property owners, who will presumably benefit from the success-
ful implementation of the ordinance. It seems indisputable that the elimination of non-
conforming uses would be a public purpose for the State's exercise of its eminent
domain powers.
64. R. ANDERSON, supra note 62, §§ 6.66-6.68.
65. See, e.g., Seattle v. Martin, 54 Wash. 2d 541, 342 P.2d 602 (1959).
66. See, e.g., Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d 553, 152 N.E.2d 42, 176
N.Y.S.2d 598 (1958).
67. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d 34
(1954).
68. The zoning ordinance in Seattle provides for amortization of non-conforming
adult motion pictures theaters within 90 days. SEATTLE, WASH., ZONING ORDINANCE
1055, § 533 (May 29, 1976). The zoning ordinances in both Atlanta, see ATLANTA, GA.,
ZONING ORDINANCE § 26.49, and Rochester, New York, see ROCHESTER, N.Y., ZONING
LAW § 115.96J, provide for amortization of non-conforming adult uses within one to
four years based on the "value" of the use.
69. See Walsh v. Anmark Enterprises, Inc., N.Y.L.J., Dec. 5, 1977, at 10, col. 5




(5) Exemption or variance criteria and procedures: The proposed
ordinance allowed the Board of Standards and Appeals and the City
Planning Commission respectively to exempt individuals from the
amortization and new location requirements of the legislation, despite
their failure to meet the concentration restrictions, as long as adverse
impact findings could be negated. This safety valve procedure was felt
essential to withstand a challenge to the reasonableness of the regulation.
When the complex locational restrictions were mapped in the five
boroughs of the City, it was found that Manhattan continued to offer
substantial locations for adult use, although at lesser concentration
levels, and that the Bronx, Queens and Staten Island allowed scattered
adult use sites. No sites were possible in Brooklyn, however, because
of the dimensional stinginess of Brooklyn's regional and downtown
commercial zones, which are closely ringed by residential zones.70
At the public hearing on this proposal before the City Planning
Commission, 71 reaction could be classified according to the following
groups, most of whom were opposed to the legislation, but often for
radically different reasons: (1) support from legitimate businesses,
property owners and residents of the adult use capital of the city-
Times Square-as well as medical professionals and general residents
of the borough of Manhattan; (2) opposition from residents of the
Bronx, Brooklyn, Queens and Staten Island who feared dispersion of
the Times Square porn concentration into their boroughs; (3) opposi-
tion from civil libertarians on grounds of first amendment constitu-
tional violations; (4) opposition from evangelical quarters to an ex-
plicit land use recognition and legalization of immoral activities.
Despite this opposition, the Commission decided to proceed with
the legislation. Crime statistics offered as part of the public record dra-
matically illustrated the adverse impact of adult use concentrations in
the Times Square area and were a compelling reason for early Com-
mission action.72 The number of felonious criminal complaints in areas
of adult use concentration were comparatively high, according to a New
York City Police Department study33 This study classified those areas
containing one or more adult uses as "morals-prone" posts. Verified
70. This accidental-indeed unintentional--exclusion of Brooklyn, dictated by
choice of city-wide mapping criteria, was used by representatives of other boroughs at
a later date to support exclusionary amendments which sought to limit adult uses solely
to Manhattan. See text accompanying note 81 infra.
71. See note 43 supra.





complaints from these posts in Midtown were 69.5 percent higher than
the verified complaints from the non-morals-prone posts. Morals-prone
posts constituted only 34.5 percent of the total number of posts in these
districts of Manhattan, yet they accounted for 47.1 percent of the total
complaints. Complaints for felonious assault were 142.3 percent higher
and grand larceny complaints were 88.9 percent higher in morals-prone
than in non-morals-prone posts.74 This data clearly supported the anti-
concentration approach of the Commission's adult use legislation.
The Commission was reasonably confident that the legislation it
presented at the initial public hearing would withstand civil liber-
tarian lawsuits. Although the proposal included amortization of non-
conforming uses-an element lacking in Detroit's ordinance-other
elements of the New York proposal were less restrictive of speech than
Detroit's legislation. For example, New York's "primary and predomi-
nant" definition, apart from being more administratively quantifiabler
and workable than Detroit's "substantial or significant" standard,70
would have permitted a substantial level of adult communication
within the commercial zones where "adult uses" were prohibited-a
level sufficient to satisfy all but the most fanatic first amendment guard-
ian. As long as adult films, books, and live entertainment did not be-
come the measurably dominant message in their respective cinemas,
bookstores and bars, such "speech" was not constrained in any com-
mercial zone. In the regional and downtown commercial districts, even
"speech" which consisted primarily and predominantly of adult mes-
sages for adult audiences was permitted. In addition, the presence of
safety valve procedures to allow exceptions to the amortization require-
ments and new location restrictions seemed to lend to the regulations
a flavor of reasonableness comparable to that found in the Detroit
scheme.77
Detroit had not needed an amortization provision; its skid-row
district concentration had already been bulldozed out of existence by
urban renewal and blocked by zoning from returning. Times Square
on the other hand was never regarded by the City as an appropriate
area for an urban renewal project. For the City simply to proscribe
new adult uses from locating in the area and leave the existing con-
74. Id.
75. A standard dictionary definition of "predominant" is "superior in number."
MERRIAM-WEBSTER DIcTIoNARY (pocket ed. 1974). In the case of films, books and the
like a "predominant" use presumably would constitute 51% of screen time in the case of
the motion picture theater, and 51% of stock in trade in the case of the bookstore.
76. Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. at 53 n.5.
77. Detroit also had used a safety valve variance procedure. Id. at 54 n.7.
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centrations to fester there was unthinkable. The crime, the nuisance,
the adverse impact on still healthy land uses in the area was growing
daily.
Land use law sanctions amortization of obnoxious uses where their
premises can be put to a conforming use.7 8 Times Square's rampant
adult theatres, bookstores, peep shows, and bars all had available al-
ternative conforming uses-among them non-X-rated films and books,
retail uses, shops and restaurants. While these uses might not pay the
top rents generated by pornography, zoning need not allow the highest
and best use of land.79
After receiving the approval of the Commission, the legislation
travelled to the Board of Estimate pursuant to New York City Charter
requirements for further consideration and ultimate enactment. The
Board has 60 days within which to vote a zoning amendment up or
down,8 0 and some of its members lost no time in getting word to the
Commission that further modifications were necessary if the legislation
was to become law. These suggested modifications varied according to
the individual Board members: the Queens Borough President wanted
the regional commercial zones in his borough put off-limits for adult
uses; the Bronx Borough President wanted those regional commercial
centers in the Bronx similarly protected 8l-but at the same time he
78. See text accompanying notes 65-67 supra.
79. Irony intended. Since Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926), courts have sanctioned zoning schemes which restrict land to less than maxi-
mally profitable uses, as long as such schemes are in accordance with a non-discriminatory
and non-confiscatory plan.
80. See 1 N.Y. Crry, N.Y., CHARTER AND ADm. CODE ANN. § 200 (Fisch 1976).
The Charter further provides that in a case where the Board of Estimate fails to act,
the prior recommendation of the City Planning Commission becomes law. To the author's
knowledge no instance of such an occurrence has been recorded.
81. See N.Y. Daily News, Mar. 30, 1977, at 47, col. 1.
Two of our borough presidents, Donald Manes of Queens and Robert
Abrams of the Bronx, are making like Horatios at their respective bridges. They
insist that the Board of Estimate adopt a zoning ordinance to limit all porno
operators to Manhattan, unconstitutional though that may be.
They say their only concern is to protect their boroughs. It looks to us
more like political grandstanding in an election year.
The real result of their obstructionism would be to leave their boroughs-
as well as the rest of the city-without any defense at all against the smut
blight.
The City Planning Commission drew up a sensible plan to end the current
legal vacuum that should meet U.S. Supreme Court standards. Mayor Beame
supports it. So should Manes and Abrams, if they really want to defend their
turfs.
Pornography is a poison that can spread unchecked throughout the
boroughs unless the city makes good use of proven zoning laws to limit it.
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attacked the legislation's insensitivity to first amendment concerns, 2
a view shared by the President of the City Council.83
Although mindful of the opposition from first amendment abso-
lutists on the one hand, and evangelical absolutists on the other, the
Commission saw no way of appeasing such opponents. Nevertheless,
it modified 4 the original legislation in three respects in response to
pressures from both the Board of Estimate and outer borough resi-
dents who feared that a dispersal of Times Square pornography would
inevitably push such adult uses to presently pristine suburbs.8
First, the lowest density regional commercial zone was dropped
as an eligible area for future adult use.88 Large groups from Staten Is-
land had cited the family trade done by shopping centers in such zones
and made a convincing case that adult uses would be incompatible
with these shopping areas.87 This modification had the effect of elimi-
nating any adult use potential in suburban-like shopping centers in
Staten Island, Queens, Brooklyn and the Bronx. Second, schools and
houses of worship were accorded protective 500 feet halos,88 within
which adult uses were barred from locating or continuing as legal non-
conforming uses. This amendment responded to community concerns
and further reduced the geographical areas in the City eligible for
adult uses. Third, the Commission dropped the definitional threshold
for adult use determination from "primary and predominant" to
"substantial or significant" concededly a more subjective test, albeit
82. The Bronx Borough President's concerns relating to the legislation's first
amendment impact can be found in the minutes of calendar #118 of the Board of
Estimate meeting of Feb. 17, 1977.
83. Kaiser, A 4-Borough Pornography Ban Unexpectedly Loses, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 25, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
84. N.Y. City Planning Commission, Report N 770022 ZRY, cal. no. 1, at 2.3
(Mar. 7, 1977).
85. Orin, If Times Square's Swept, Will Queens Get the Dirt, L.I. Press, Feb.
20, 1977, at 1, col. 1. However, a contemporary computer survey of morals-prone uses
fin the outer boroughs indicated findings somewhat at variance with the prevalent
self-image of these areas. According to Borough Commanding Officer, Police Depart-
ment memoranda (October 8-November 2, 1976), eight topless bars and a porno-
graphic movie theater were operating in Staten Island. Three massage parlors, two
pornographic bookstores and/or peep shows, 22 topless bars, and 11 pornographic movie V
theaters were found in Queens. One massage parlor, two pornographic bookstores, 30
topless bars, and 10 pornographic movie theaters existed in Brooklyn. And 17 topless
bars and five pornographic movie theaters turned up in the Bronx. (Memoranda on
file with the New York City Planning Commission.)
86. Id. This eliminated adult use from the City's C4-1 (lowest density regional com-
mercial zone) districts.
87. N.Y. City Planning Commission, transcript of public hearings of Dec. 1, 1976,
at 150. A copy of this transcript is on file at the Commission.
88. See note 85 supra. An analogous provision for a 200 ft. buffer from "a build-
ing occupied exclusively as a school, church, synagogue or other place of worship" may
be found in N.Y. ALCO. BEv. CONT. LAW § 64(7) (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1977).
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sustained by the Supreme Court in Young.89 Once adult use zoning
legislation was passed, the City presumably could establish adminis-
trative standards which would afford bookstores, newstands, cinemas
and bars guidance as to how much adult material could be purveyed
before the "substantial or significant" -threshold was crossed.90
These amendments, although supported by a majority of Com-
missioners nevertheless split the heretofore unanimous Commission.
In a dissent joined by two other Commissioners, Gordon J. Davis
found that the Commission had increased the risk that the legisla-
tion's content-based land use proscriptions on speech and speech-re-
lated sex establishments would be found violative of the First Amend-
ment, and that it had ignored the policy of dispersal of these offensive
uses which was a principal consideration in formulating the adult uses
zoning controlsY-
Commissioner Davis' dissent contains a thoughtful statement of
the concern for competing values which animated the Commission in
its approach to this problem:
There were three overriding and interrelated considerations which
guided the Commission when it formulated the Adult Use Legisla-
tion. First, we clearly understood that a large proportion of the uses
sought to be controlled involved speech or speech-related activities
which, no matter how noxious or sexually explicit, were presumptively
protected from direct content-based regulation by the First Amend-
ment. In other words, we were not dealing with noxious uses of the
type heretofore routinely subject to zoning controls, such as junk
yards, slaughter houses, etc. Rather, we were attempting to regulate
uses which could not be flatly prohibited or restricted in a manner
which would prevent adult audiences from having relatively free
access to the type of expression or merchandise which they offered.
Secondly, given that these uses had to be allowed in some parts of
the City, the Commission was convinced that their dispersal-as op-
posed to concentration in a "red-light" district-was by far the wiser
strategy to pursue. Boston's "Combat Zone," and indeed, our own
Times Square area, provided alarming examples of the destructive
consequences which would flow from a policy of concentration.
Thirdly, taking these factors into account, it was clear that the
Commission should pattern its regulations of sex-oriented uses involv-
ing protected expression after the similar-though less restrictive-
zoning legislation enacted by Detroit and recently approved as con-
stitutional by the United States Supreme Court in Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc ..... [A] more precise statement of what was
89. 427 U.S. at 53 n.5.
90. For a discussion of the administrative problems created by such a definition,
see Justice Blackmun's dissent. Id. at 88.
91. N.Y. City Planning Commission, Report N 770022 ZRY, cal. no. 1, at 4-7
(Mar. 7, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Davis Dissent].
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decided [there] by a divided court .. . is difficult to formulate....
Although uncertain and obscure in many respects, one thing is clear
from American Mini Theatres: a zoning scheme which is significantly
more restrictive than the one approved by the Court in that decision
is far less likely to be sustained by the Federal Courts. 92
Commissioner Davis warned that the amendments virtually
banned adult uses from four of the City's five boroughs.93 Although
hyperbolic at the time, the statement was soon echoed in the chambers
of the Board of Estimate--only this time as a demand-by citizens
of the outer boroughs. By virtue of the recent Commission amend-
ments, the heretofore dispersed and scattered eligible adult use
regional commercial zones had been reduced to a handful of readily
identifiable concentration targets in these boroughs-and as such,
drew sharp denunciations. The Commission was accused of fostering
"red light districts" in the outer boroughs and the cry was raised ever
more loudly to restrict adult uses to Manhattan.
Never before had an issue so polarized the five boroughs of the
City: citizens of the Bronx, Brooklyn, Queens and Staten Island were
pitted against citizens of Manhattan. Indeed, many residents of Man-
hattan outside the adult use purlieus favored restriction of such uses
to the present confines of the Times Square area. It was the early
days of the Boston "Combat Zone" revisited. Despite the clear ad-
vantages of the legislation-pointed out editorially in New York news-
papers9 4 -in restricting the hitherto unrestricted commercial adult
uses, community representatives in the outer boroughs persisted in
their ideological stance. Rather than tackling the difficult political
questions, the Mayor resorted to highly publicized raids and street
demonstrations. (See cartoon opposite page.)
92. Davis Dissent, supra note 91, at 5-6. As authority for his third point, Com-
missioner Davis referred to the following analysis of Young:
American Mini Theatres may signal only the willingness of a majority [of the
Court] to accept mild regulation of speech in the service of a city's demon-
strated need, like Detroit's, to protect the quality of life in its neighbor-
hoods .... Thus construed, American Mini Theatres [does not extend] . . .
to zoning schemes justified only by distaste for expression, such as geographic
constraints on the exhibition of non-obscene [sexually explicit] movies uncon-
nected to general zoning schemes.
Davis Dissent, supra note 91, at 6 (quoting The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 J-IARV.
L. REv. 204 (1976)).
93. Davis Dissent, supra note 91, at 3-4.
94. Pornography in a Twilight Zone, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1977, at 28, col. 5;
Porn and Politics, N.Y. Daily News, Mar. 27, 1977, at 19, col. 1; The People Speak,
N.Y. Daily News, Feb. 22, 1977, at 31, col. 1; Hope for Times Square, N.Y. Daily
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The legislation foundered. After several days of parliamentary
wrangling preceding its deadline for action, the Board of Estimate
rejected the legislation, sending it back to the Commission for further
study.95 This failure by the City's legislative body to act had, among
other consequences, the immediate result of leaving massage parlors
free to continue operations unrestricted by zoning.00 While further
study did indeed occur, no subsequent proposal intruded upon Board
of Estimate calendars prior to the November, 1977, city-wide elections
of its sitting members.
II. THE CHANGING CLIMATE FOR PORNOGRAPHY UNDER OBscENITY
LAWS
The middle class voters of the Bronx, Brooklyn, Queens and
Staten Island failed to find any social value in adult films and books,
despite the first amendment protection accorded them. Furthermore,
they were outraged by New York City's explicit land use regulation
proposal, which they perceived as placing an official imprimatur on
pornography. They wished to bar these adult uses from their shores.0 7
This morally indignant public was unable to appreciate the fine legal
distinction between the pornographic and the obscene urged by city
planners as the reason for allowing adult cinemas and bookstores a
rightful and reasonable place in the plan of city zoning uses and dis-
tricts. Etched in a series of post-World War II decisions of the Supreme
Court,98 this distinction protected the first amendment rights of the
silent minority to indulge their preference for pornography, free from
the constraints of obscenity laws. Lack of public understanding of this
legally crucial distinction between pornography and obscenity led to
public characterization of the City's zoning proposal itself as immoral
and obscene.
Whether a film or book is indeed obscene-and therefore out-
side the pale of the law's protection-varies with time and place.
Weather, being changeable, is an apt metaphor to describe the lack of
consistent principle in this demonstrably volatile area of life. Every
reader of English literature is aware of its seasonal shifts from the
95. Ranzal, Beame Bid on Pornography Zoning Sent Back to Planning Commis-
sion, N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1977, at 23, col. 1.
96. Massage parlors, to the extent their name was a euphemism for houses of
prostitution, continued to be subject to criminal laws. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 230-230.40
(McKinney 1976). Of course, the burden of proof is much higher in criminal cases. See
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
97. See note 81 supra.
98. See text accompanying notes 109-23 infra.
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sexually explicit-often torrid-style of the 16th, 17th, and 18th
centuries, as seen in Shakespeare, Swift, Congreve, and Sheridan, to
the sexually frigid 19th century Victorian restraint of Dickens, Trol-
lope, and Gaskell. Not only does the obscenity barometer shift within
countries over time; it oscillates wildly when travelling in the same
time track among countries that lack a common heritage.
The common or dominant anti-obscenity heritage reflected on-
and-off in most Western Judeo-Christian nations derives from St. Au-
gustine99 who wrote between 413 and 426 A.D. that the only proper
sexual arousal is that which furthers the reproduction of the human
species within the sanctified institution of marriage. Everything else,
more or less depending on the subsequent century, is forbidden as
obscene.
Webster's derives its definition of obscenity from ob meaning
against and caenum meaning filth.100 The concept of obscenity hovers
around the notion of proper and improper bodily functions. Obscene
acts of bodily abomination and uncleanness figure importantly in the
Bible,101 providing moral guidance that contrasts with that of other
Biblical passages which celebrate often explicit sexuality between
lovers. 02 The Bible, as a document composed over a period of a thou-
sand years, was hardly immune to changes in the climate for obscenity.
No longer are acts of masturbation and frequent marital sexual
intercourse regarded as secret vices dangerous to health as they once
were. 03 Mere nudity, 04 violence, 0 5 sacrilege, 0 6 and vulgarity' 07-
without more-have been held not to constitute obscenity. On the
other hand, depictions of hard core sexual intercourse, fellatio, cun-
nilingus, group sex, flagellation, fetishism, sodomy, lesbianism, sado-
masochism, and bestiality all have been found obscene under various
judicial formulations. 08
While zoning's middle class constituency might applaud -the latter
decisions, it is doubtful whether a legislative endorsement for nudity,
violence, sacrilege or vulgarity would ever be forthcoming. And yet,
99. AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD 470-72 (M. Dods trans. 1950).
100. WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1557 (1965).
101. The episodes alluding to occurrences in Sodom and Gomorrah are perhaps
the most celebrated context for obscene act9 in the Bible. Genesis 13:13.
102. The lyrics in Song of Solomon best illustrate the erotic side of the Bible.
Song of Solomon, 4:5, 5:4, 7:8, 10.
103. COMSTOCK, TRAPS FOR THE YOUNG (R. Brenner ed. 1967).
104. Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958).
105. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
106. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
107. Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946).
108. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Mishkln v. New
York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
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such an endorsement is envisioned by the Young decision when it looks
to the zoning process for a Solomon-like distribution of first amend-
ment protected adult uses in a city.
The following review of Supreme Court decisions in the obscenity
area is intended to give the reader an understanding of the factors pro-
tecting pornographic material from the limited reach of obscenity
regulation-that is, an appreciation of the dominant and heavy weight
accorded first amendment rights in the judicial scale when balanced
with local police power obscenity regulations. These free speech factors
continued to receive considerable deference from the Court in Young
and so must be carefully considered when devising any zoning proposal
to regulate pornographic uses. Failure to understand and consider these
factors in drafting a proposal could render the zoning scheme as poten-
tially violative of the first amendment as those obscenity regulations
contained in many of the cases hereinafter discussed. These cases
should dispell as well any naive optimism concerning the alacrity
with which the political actors in a zoning drama will respond to an
opportunity to regulate not-quite-hard-core pornography. In short, the
majoritarian attitudes which dominate the zoning process may prove
insufficiently malleable to embrace and fairly regulate close-to-hard-core
material found non-obscene and entitled to first amendment protec-
tion.
The development of objective and manageable standards to enable
the trier of fact to distinguish protected pornographic speech from un-
protected obscenity has been one of the Supreme Court's major post-
World War II preoccupations. The Court has been frustrated, how-
ever, in its repeated attempts to identify and define which portion of
the speech spectrum lies outside the scope of constitutional protection.
The Court's inability to do so became evident in 1957 in Roth v.
United States,'," its first attempt to grapple with these highly charged
issues. While the Court declared that the first amendment's protective
embrace will not extend to material deemed to be obscene,11° it failed
to formulate a test to assist juries in identifying that which is obscene.
The Court's second attempt to formulate appropriate criteria
came in 1966 when, in a plurality opinion in John Cleland's Memoirs
of a Woman of Pleasure v. Attorney General of Massachusetts,1 the
Court declared that for a work to be considered obscene:
[T]hree elements must coalesce: it must be established that (a) the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient
109. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
110. Id. at 481-85.
111. 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
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interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it af-
fronts contemporary community standards relating to the descrip-
tion or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is ut-
terly without redeeming social value.Y12
For a period of seven years following Memoirs the Court remained
unable to muster a majority of its members in support of a test for
obscenity.113 The Court was forced to issue summary opinions stating
whether or not at least five of its members found the material in ques-
tion to be obscene. 1 4 This approach proved highly unsatisfactory since
no criteria of what constituted obscenity emerged to guide the lower
courts.
In 1973, in Miller v. California,1 5 the Court announced what ap-
peared at first to be a definitive obscenity test. The basic guidelines
for trier of fact were held to be:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community
standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest...
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state laws;
and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.116
In one of Miller's companion cases, Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton," 7
the Court held that where a film is clearly obscene under the Miller
test, a state could constitutionally prohibit its exhibition entirely, even
to audiences composed solely of knowledgeable adults.1"
Under the Miller test, constitutional protection is unavailable to
material not having "serious literary, artistic, political or scientific
value.""19 This aspect of Miller represented a considerable retrench-
ment from Memoirs, which denied protection only to material that is
"utterly without redeeming social value."' 2 0 The Court, however, re-
112. Id. at 418.
113. See e.g., Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 770-71 (1967).
114. See Hartstein v. Missouri, 404 U.S. 988 (1971); Burgin v. South Carolina,
404 U.S. 806 (1971); Bloss v. Michigan, 402 U.S. 938 (1971); Childs v. Oregon,
401 U.S. 1006 (1971).
115. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
116. Id. at 24.
117. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
118. Id. at 57.
119. 413 U.S. at 26.
120. 383 U.S. at 419.
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served for itself the task of determining whether a work is obscene
under its own seriousness standards. The remaining elements of the
test, the questions of "patent offensiveness" and "prurient interest,"
were deemed to be questions of fact. By transforming the bulk of ob-
scenity determination into a "factual" inquiry, the Court attempted to
imbue the jury with vastly increased power while relieving appellate
courts of the need to undertake a burdensome de novo review in each
individual case.
These brave goals were seriously impaired the following year in
the notorious "Carnal Knowledge" case, Jenkins v. Georgia.12' In
overturning an obscenity conviction upheld by the Georgia Supreme
Court, the Supreme Court once again constituted itself as the ultimate
board of censors by reserving for itself the bulk of obscenity determina-
tion, exactly as it had done in -the "bad old days" following Roth.A22
The objective tests it had articulated in Miller to enable local juries to
discharge the censorial function were implicitly rejected in Jenkins.
The Jenkins Court paid lip service to the primacy of local jury deter-
mination by holding that the values of the local, rather than statewide,
community were to govern juries in determining what is obscene under
Miller's "contemporary community standards" test. By overturning the
Georgia jury's determination, however, the Court implicitly ruled that
the members of the jury incorrectly perceived the standards of their
own community. The Courts holding would appear to limit severely
the degree of flexibility permitted trial juries in applying local stand-
ards of morality in obscenity trials. The Court's own example is a
precedent for appellate judges to apply their own standards of moral-
ity, thus draining the concept of "local community standards" of any
vitality. 123
121. 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
122. See text accompanying notes 109-12 supra.
123. To make matters worse, not only did the Court re-establish the appellate
level as the primary forum for obscenity determination, it severely eroded the "serious
value" aspect of the Miller test, the only element of that test truly appropriate for
appellate review. That element is generally susceptible to the sort of objective inquiry
that cannot usually be applied to questions of "prurient interest" and "patent offensive-
ness."
In upsetting the defendant's conviction, the Jenkins Court chose to ignore what
appeared to be the most compelling reason for reversal: the film's significance as a
work of serious artistic merit. The Court relied instead on the far more subjective
"patently offensive" aspect of the Miller test and reversed the conviction based on
what it considered an erroneous finding by the jury that Carnal Knowledge was
"patently offensive." 418 U.S. at 160-61. The Court's failure to discuss "serious value"
may have signalled an implicit erosion of that crucial standard by making it unclear how
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This shift in the law of obscenity may be desirable insofar as
appellate courts are more likely to be responsive to first amendment
claims than are local judges and juries. What this means, however, is
that the Burger Court, like the Warren Court before it, has reluctantly
become a board of supercensors.
Legal commentators have generally been hostile to the Burger
Court's subtle expansion of the obscenity concept at the expense of
first amendment guarantees, particularly to the Court's enshrinement
of local rather than national standards and its abandonment of the
"utterly without redeeming social value" test.124 These commentators
emphasize the importance of the pornographic vision to expression and
understanding, and decry suppressions of obscenity-such as Bowder-
lized Shakespeare'-2 and President Nixon's "expletives deleted"'-2 --as
tantamount to a prohibition of meaning. This view is succinctly ex-
pressed by David A. Richards: "[I]t is difficult to see why the porno-
graphic vision should not have a place in the marketplace of ideas
beside other visions that celebrate the life of the mind, the sanctity of
ascetic piety or the usefulness of prudent self-discipline.' ' 27
If an obscenity law is an expression of popular or majoritarian
moral attitudes, this view finds it must collide with the main purpose
of the first amendment, which is to secure "the greatest equal liberty
of communication compatible with a like liberty for all.' 128 The
Miller test, which enshrines any state law defining depictions of pat-
ently offensive sexual conduct as obscene, "would elevate every form of
popular prejudice, bigotry, and intolerance, without more, into a moral
basis for law," according to this critique.'2
much evidence the Court will require to review a jury determination that a work lacks
"serious value."
The Court's continuing deference to the principle of local community standards
can be found in Pinkus v. United States, 46 U.S.L.W. 4478 (May 5, 1978). The Court,
per Burger, G.J., held that the attitudes of children may not be incorporated by the
judge or jury in determining what the local community standard is.
124. See Fahringer and Brown, supra note 1; Gellhorn, Dirty Books, Disgusting
Pictures, and Dreadful Laws, 8 GA. L. REv. 291, 297-98 (1974); Richards, Free
Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123
U. PA. L. REv. 45, 79-81 (1974).
125. Dr. Thomas Bowdler eliminated racy passages from Shakespeare's theatrical
canon to conform to prevalent 19th century values. W. SHAKESPEARE, THE FAMILY
SHAKESPEARE (T. Bowdler ed. 1807).
126. In his release of the celebrated Watergate tape transcripts, President Nixon
deleted all offensive expletives on the questionable premise that such censorship did not
impair their substantive meaning.
127. Richards, supra note 124, at 81.
128. Id. at 83.
129. Id. at 86.
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These attacks on the Burger Court's obscenity decisions are per-
haps overstated, since these decisions preserved much of the earlier
Warren Court's first amendment libertarian framework, including the
requirement of dominant appeal to the prurient interest (i.e., mere
nudity is not enough), social value as a strong counterpoise, and the
right of private individuals to choose-in private-their own preferred
obscenity. Clearly, even these commentators would agree that recent
obscenity decisions, standing alone, would hardly rid the nation of
smut.
Moreover, an alternative means of controlling the pornography
explosion-the civil nuisance procedure-was made ineffective in Paris
Adult Theater I v. Slaton,'3 0 when the Supreme Court conditionally
approved such a procedure "assuming the use of a constitutionally ac-
ceptable standard for determining what is unprotected by the First
Amendment.''3 The incorporation of an obscenity "standard" was
completed in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,13 2 when the Court held
unconstitutional a municipal public nuisance ordinance prohibiting
drive-in movie theatres from exhibiting nudity which could be seen
from a public street 33 Several states have followed the Court's stricture
by engrafting obscenity standards onto their public nuisance ordi-
nances.134 Similarly, private nuisance actions, which hold the possibility
of avoiding constitutional entanglement,313 hardly constituted the di-
rect public measure necessary to check the proliferation of non-obscene
but still offensive adult pornographic uses.
Perhaps realizingthese deficiencies in existing law, Chief Justice
Burger, writing for the Court in Slaton, suggested a new basis for smut
control: "the interest of the public in the quality of life and the total
community environment, the tone of commerce in the great city
centers."' 36 Reacting to the concern directed by Alexander Bickel'3T
130. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
131. Id. at 55.
132. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
133. Id. at 212.
134. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4711 (West 1968 & Supp. 1974); OHio
REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.01(c) (Page 1971); Grove Press Inc. v. City of Philadelphia,
418 F.2d 82 (3rd Cir. 1969); State ex tel. Ewing v. Without a Stitch, 66 Ohio Op. 2d
223, 307 N.E.2d 911 (1974). See 49 IND. L.J. 320 (1974).
135. The constitutional question raised by private nuisance actions is whether or
not the requested injunctive relief constitutes state action; if it does not, then the
defendant cannot raise the first amendment as a defense. Cases in the race relations
area support the inference that private nuisance actions are not state actions. See, e.g.,
Moose Lodge v. Iris, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
136. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 (1973).
137. Bickel, 22 PuBLIc INTEREST 25-26 (1971).
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and others13 at offensive public conduct "impinging on other pri-
vacies," the Burger Court embarked on the yellow-brick-road which
was to lead it to Young and the potential of land use zoning controls
for cleaning up America's tarnished Emerald City of Oz.
III. THE PROMISE AND THE PERIL OF ZONING OBSCENITY
The rigid libertarian limitations placed by the Warren Court
on obscenity as a state regulatory weapon were neatly skirted in Young
through the recognized methodology of zoning incompatible uses far
away from each other. "Adult use" as a zoning classification far out-
strips the reach of obscenity as a speech classification. 189 While zoning
did not censor "adult" speech (as obscenity laws did), it imposed a
cordon sanitaire around it as city planners had once buffered residences
from glue factories. "The quality of life" as protected by local zoning
struck a widely shared resonant chord in the environment-conscious
1970's; an equivalent obscenity consensus had proven elusive.
Zoning regulations have historically been designed to prevent
harm, e.g., by separating incompatible uses, by limiting the density and
scale of particular neighborhoods, by prohibiting or restricting devel-
opment when public services are unavailable, and by protecting ad-
joining parcels from invasion of their light and air. It was not until
1926 that the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance was tested by the
Supreme Court. In a landmark decision, Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 140 the Supreme Court validated a comprehensive zoning
plan. The Court's holding was narrow.141 However, the general test of
a zoning ordinance suggested by the Court is still instructive. Before a
zoning ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, its provisions must
be shown to be "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substan-
tial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare."'1
Euclid and its progeny reflect the idea that "general welfare" is a
constantly growing and necessary aspect of the sovereign police power.
Euclid also suggests that the use of zoning is a legitimate mode of pro-
138. See, e.g., P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965).
139. Its broader sweep segregates protected adult "speech" as well as obscene adult
"speech" from residential and neighborhood retail areas.
140. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
141. The Court held: "[ilt is enough for us to determine, as we do, that the
ordinance in its general scope and dominant features, so far as its provisions are here
involved, is a valid exercise of authority, leaving other provisions to be dealt with as
cases arise directly involving them." Id. at 397.
142. Id. at 395.
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tecting the ever-changing general welfare. Justice Sutherland recog-
nized this trend.
Until recent years, urban life was comparatively simple; but with the
great increase and concentration of population, problems have de-
veloped, and constantly axe developing, which require, and will con-
tinue to require, additional restrictions in respect of the use and occu-
pation of private lands in urban communities. Regulations, the wis-
dom, necessity and validity of which, as applied to existing conditions,
are so apparent that they are now uniformly sustained, a century ago,
or even half a century ago, probably would have been rejected as
arbitrary and oppressive. . . . [W]hile the meaning of constitutional
guaranties never varies, the scope of their application must expand or
contract to meet the new and different conditions which are con-
stantly coming within the field of their operation.' 43
Courts have continued to test zoning ordinances under the "clearly
arbitrary and unreasonable" standard, and, as the New York Court of
Appeals noted, "[r]estrictions upon the use of property, which were
deemed unreasonable in 1909, are regarded today as entirely reason-
able and natural."'
Traditional zoning has a methodology, tested over the crucible
of 60 years,1 45 for dealing with incompatible uses. Every known use is
classified in the zoning system according to benefits and harmful ex-
ternalities and allowed to locate in those districts where its benefits to
society are maximized. Uses are prohibited in those districts where
their harmful externalities outweigh their benefits. In a supremely
rational society, zoning provides "a place for everything, where every-
thing is in its place."
Since society is always changing, the problem of identifying, ana-
lyzing and classifying new uses is hardly novel. Zoning has risen to the
challenge of billboards, shopping centers, drive-ins, mobile homes,
skateboard parks, fast food, discotheques, and countless other "new
uses" in its history. The solution for each challenge has varied with the
time and the place; to the extent that a zoning solution might be
rationally debatable, courts have been loathe to disturb it.
143. Id. at 386-87.
144. Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 268, 225 N.E.2d 749, 752, 279 N.Y.S.2d
22, 26 (1967) (quoting In re Mid-State Advertising Corp. v. Bond, 274 N.Y. 82,
87, 8 N.E.2d 286, 288 (1937) (Judge Finch dissenting)).
145. In 1916, New York City enacted the nation's first comprehensive zoning
ordinance. C. BERGER, LAND OWNERSHIP AND UsE 662 (2d ed. 1975). In August of
1922, the United States Department of Commerce drafted a standard state zoning
enabling act, which was similar to New York's statute. Id. at 655-66.
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The promise of zoning for dealing with adult uses, which had
become more ubiquitous with the passing of time, would be fulfilled
by assigning adult uses "a place" on the zoning map based on a rational
analysis of benefits and harmful externalities. The peril of content-
based zoning of adult uses lurks in zoning's potential for the irrational
-albeit politically supportable-classification. For most new use regu-
lation this peril is resolved in favor of the municipality when courts
reject fourteenth amendment challenges from property owners as long
as the ordinance is not confiscatory and its wisdom at least debatable.
In such cases, the charge of arbitrariness cannot be laid at the munici-
pality's door.
But there would seem to be a new constitutional peril where
traditional zoning takes on content-based regulation in the teeth of
the first amendment, rather than between the bare and tired gums
of the fourteenth. The traditional fourteenth amendment zoning
tests of arbitrariness, 146 discrimination, 147 confiscation,1 48 and "spot
zoning"' 49 occur in a setting where courts have traditionally deferred
to, and been reluctant to intrude their wisdom upon, legislatures who
are, after all, elected by and accountable to the people.150 In the de-
fense of first amendment guarantees, however, courts have not been
shy about imposing their views upon local legislatures.'8 '
In this context, Powell's emphasis in Young on the above-quoted
Euclid language, 52 envisioning ever-broader general-welfare regula-
146. Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22
(1967).
147. Restrictions applied selectively to properties within a zoning district are not
necessarily discriminatory if there is a rational basis for such distinctions. The key to
this equal protection test is that the proposed regulation be in accordance with a
comprehensive plan. See Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HAxv.
L. Rnv. 1154, 1166-70 (1955).
148. Courts have consistently held that where the property regulated was not de-
prived of all profitable remaining use and when the regulation is rationally related to
a comprehensive plan, the zoning regulation will be upheld. See Consolidated Rock
Prods. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638
(1962).
149. Spot zoning is a pejorative expression usually denoting an intention to bene-
fit a single property owner rather than to zone in accordance with a comprehensive
plan. The "spot zone," instead of constituting a part of a larger area which is zoned
uniformly, sticks out like a sore thumb from its more restrictively zoned neighbors. For
an extensive discussion of spot zoning, see R. ANDERSON, supra note 62, at §§ 5.08-5.09.
150. With respect to direct voter referenda in the area of zoning, the U.S. Su-
,preme Court has relieved "the people" of the legislature's burden to show that its
action in voting for a specific zoning plan is in accordance with a comprehensive or
well-considered plan. See City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S.
668 (1976).
151. See notes 97-132 & accompanying text supra.
152. See text accompanying note 143 supra.
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tory objectives as authority for Detroit's use of zoning to deal with the
problem of adult uses, is a meaningful bow in the direction of the
fourteenth amendment zoning cases. Measuring Detroit's regulation
against fourteenth amendment "taking" claims, Powell finds that the
proposed Pussy Cat and Nortown Theatres are "affected no differently
from any other commercial enterprise that suffers economic detriment
as a result of land-use regulation."'153 Justice Stevens views zoning
regulations that distinguish adult from general movie theatres as ra-
tional and "adequately" motivated by the city's interest in the present
and future character of its neighborhoods. 15 4 This embrace-by a ma-
jority of the Court-of the application of traditional zoning techniques
to adult uses prompted New York City to graft traditionally accepted
techniques for amortization of non-conforming uses'5 5 onto the Detroit
model.
No viable alternative to amortization as a means of diluting the
existing concentration of adult uses in the Times Square area was avail-
able to New York City. Even assuming the existence of a sufficiently
robust municipal treasury, the prospect of paying proprietors of porno-
graphic businesses with public dollars as part of a large-scale condemna-
tion program to terminate their operations would be unacceptable to
most segments of the public-as a "payoff" condoning immorality-
and would have been a politically impossible program to implement.
New York City's amortization proposal was risky, since Justices
Stevens and Powell had both pointed out the purely prospective
nature of the Detroit regulation and its "minimal"'5 0 or "slight"'15 7
impact on speech. A clue to a more precise standard may be Powell's
willingness to entertain some "overall curtailment of adult movie pres-
entations" provided such curtailment does not reach "significant" pro-
portions. 5 It seems clear, however, that should future first amendment
challenges to amortization of adult uses reach the Court, its decision
will be based on whether, "[v]iewed as an entity, the market for this
commodity is essentially unrestrained."' '59
Both Stevens and Powell derive considerable comfort from their
153. 427 U.S. at 78.
154. Id. at 72.
155. See text accompanying notes 62-65 supra.
156. 427 U.S. at 78.
157. Id. at 72 n.35.
158. Id. at 77-79 (passim).
159. Id. at 62. This test would permit substantial elimination of existing adult




view that Detroit's regulation fills a traditional zoning niche and is
therefore heir apparent to all the fourteenth amendment precedents
in favor of zoning, starting with Euclid. They part company from each
other, to say nothing of their distance from the four dissenting justices,
when wrestling with the competing values represented by police power
zoning and the first amendment.
The plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions in Young can
be seen as a tension wire between competing values extending from
Powell's dominant police power premise at one extreme, to Stevens'
conveniently-created "second-class" or inferior speech category, to free
speech dominance expressed by the Stewart' 60 and Blackmun' 6' dissents
at its dther end. The Court's decision is thus an unstable blend of
Powell's police power and Stevens' second-class speech rationales. :
Powell's broad assertion of police power supremacy resolves this
tension without regard to the type or content of the speech involved.
His police power construct run's the full gamut of traditional objec-
tives: health, safety, morals and general welfare, although the Young
facts rest principally on a "morals" objective. 62 In contrast, Stevens
looks to the character of the speech as well as to the particular police
power exercise in resolving the tension. 63 For the dissenting justices,
the competing police power objective falls before a sweeping first
amendment supremacy assertion.1 64 Only future cases will establish
whether the Court intends to apply the Powell-Stevens construct to all
police power objectives or limit the incursion on free speech to public
morals or possibly health and safety objectives. One awaits with a sink-
ing feeling new Supreme Court candidates for classification as second-
class speech. 65
It is important to review the accepted range of permissible police
power objectives in order to understand the extent of future conflict
with the first amendment opened up by the Young decision. While this
160. 427 U.S. at 84-88.
161. Id. at 88-96.
162. See generally Berbysse, Conflict in the Courts: Obscenity Control & First
Amendment Freedoms, 20 OATH. LAW. 1 (1974).
163. 427 U.S. at 63-73.
164. Id. at 84-96.
165. The Supreme Court may have paved the way for Justice Stevens' "second-class"
speech idea by refusing to treat certain non-verbal communication as speech in United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). Giving explicit sanction to the notion of a
lesser level of speech which is unprotected may open the door to "second-class" charac-
terization of unpopular forms of political expression. But cf. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S.
809 (1975) (eliminating the distinction between "ordinary" and "commercial" speech),
overruling Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
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range of objectives has grown more extensive over time as a result of
favorable judicial action, it is the author's position that many of these
recently sanctioned objectives-such as aesthetic zoning-represent
questionable choices in a legal tug of war between the competing
values of "quality of life" and the first amendment.
Traditional local zoning regulations implement police power
granted under state enabling legislation which is typically formulated
"to promote the health, safety, morals 06 and general welfare of the
people.' 167  Occasionally, the enabling authority omits the word
"morals." Even in this case, the relationship of a zoning regulation to
a moral objective is accepted as a reasonable nexus between regulatory
sanctions and the realization of a well-considered or comprehensive
plan. 68
A persuasive relationship between the particular legislation and
a permissible public purpose has always been the substantive due proc-
ess measure for judging the validity of an exercise of police power
against an individual's claim of deprivation of constitutional rights.
Persuasive police power arguments behind obscenity regulations60
have included adverse impact on morals, early inducement of criminal
conduct, adverse personality attitudes with criminal consequences in
the long-term, 70 and reduction in the general quality of life. 17 The
impact of obscenity on children has always made the legislative case
even more compelling. All of the aforegoing are equally persuasive as
the morals nexus of a zoning regulation. 72
Whether zoning exists 'to further in a rational manner the legiti-
mate planning goals envisioned in the classical enabling acts or "to
reinforce local social biases, which were they not cloaked in police
166. For early Supreme Court recognition of the morals aspect of the police power,
see Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465 (1877) (dictum), and Barbier v. Connolly, 113
U.S. 27 (1885) (dictum).
167. Most jurisdictions possess express enabling statutes to zone for moral purposes.
See Appendix A for a review of 50 state enabling acts. Courts in jurisdictions without an
explicit "morals" sanction in their zoning enabling statute often include upholding com-
munity morals as a valid zoning objective. See, e.g., City of Long Beach v. California
Lambda Chapter of Sigma Alpha Epsilon Fraternity, 255 Cal. App. 2d 789, 794, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 419, 422 (1967); Wiggins v. City of Jacksonville, 311 So.2d 406 (Fla. App. 1975).
168. See cases cited in note 167 supra.
169. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877, 937 (1963).
170. But see PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION oN OBSCENITY AND PORNOORAPHY REPORT,
233-87 (1970).
171. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57-60 (1973).
172. Address by Dr. Victor B. Kline, Professor of Psychology, given at the Rally for
Decency, Salt Palace Arena, in Salt Lake City, Utah (Oct. 16, 1976).
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power, would be condemned out of hand by the courts"'173 is a Dr.
Jekyll and Mr. Hyde conundrum which will probably never be re-
solved. Nonetheless, local zoning ordinances have at one time or an-
other, despite some criticism, 177 condemned motels,1 74 mobile homes175
and taverns 76 for encouraging immorality. Moreover, it is difficult
to perceive anything approaching a fundamental sea-change when
"morals" is not included with the words "health, safety and general
welfare" in the state act enabling localities to enact zoning laws.
Reported decisions have often emphasized some, and disregarded
other, enabling purposes of zoning. Regulations related to health,
safety and morals tended to find a more secure footing with the courts
than did those regulations premised upon the more ambiguous general
welfare purpose. 78 For example, aesthetic regulations not expressly
contemplated in the Standard Zoning Enabling Act were, in the early
period following Euclid, found to have a less explicit relationship to
a comprehensive plan than uniform zoning classifications based upon
incompatible use or bulk and density regulations. 79 After many years
of step-child status under narrow zoning enabling act readings, o80
aesthetics has achieved standing under the police-power general-welfare
objective, along with previously accepted health, safety, and morals
objectives.' 8 '
While many regard the admission of aesthetics into the general
welfare zoning pantheon as unmitigated cause for rejoicing, caution
regarding local aesthetic mandates operating under the police power
at the expense of Bill of Rights guarantees is certainly warranted in
173. Babcock, "Mr. Commissioner, are You Prepared for Cross-Examination?" 3
INSTITUTE ON PLANNING AND ZONING 155, 163-64 (1962).
174. See Nott v. Wolff, 18 I1. 2d 362, 163 N.E.2d 809 (1960).
175. See Vickers v. Township Committee of Gloucester, 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129
(1967).
176. See Saladino v. City of S. Beloit, 9 Ill. 2d 320, 137 N.E.2d 364 (1956).
177. Note, Zoning Morality--An Abuse of the Legislative Grant, 4 TULSA L.J. 76
(1967).
178. R. ANDERSON, supra note 62 at § 7.03.
179. Id. at § 7.21. See Matter of Melita v. Nolan, 126 Misc. 345, 347, 213 N.Y.S.
674, 677 (1926) ; City of Little Falls v. Fisk, 24 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1941).
180. A good example of this type of case is White's Appeal, 287 Pa. 259, 134 A.
409 (1926), where setback regulations were found not to lie within the state's narrowly
construed health, safety or morals enabling act police powers.
181. This trend can be perceived as early as 1927 in Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603,
609 (1927), and in the eloquent uncertainties of Judge Cardozo's opinion in People v.
Rubenfeld, 254 N.Y. 245, 172 N.E. 485 (1930). It culminates in judicial expressions such
as in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) ("It is within the power of the legisla-
ture to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as
well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled."), and People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.
2d 462, 466, 191 N.E.2d 272, 274, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, 737 (1963).
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view of Young. In People v. Stover,82 the New York Court of Appeals
sustained a zoning regulation of the Town of Rye prohibiting the
hanging of clotheslines in front and side yards of homes in a single-
family residential zone. While Rye had denominated its regulation as
one enacted for safety reasons, the court, anxious to legitimate aesthet-
ics as a regulatory objective in New York State, found the regulation
valid as an exercise of police power to promote particular aesthetics.
The defendant had asserted first and fourteenth amendment defenses,
claiming that his littered washlines were a protest against excessive
property taxation, as well as a necessary use of his front and side yards.
The court deferred to Rye's wisdom on Stover's fourteenth amend-
ment challenge and skirted the speech issue by finding that the State
could permissibly regulate Stover's "bizarre" conduct in displaying
dirty underwear and old rags where all could see them. 8 3
In dissent, Judge Van Voorhis expressed grave reservations over
the constitutional impact of Rye's regulation, pointing out that "the
avoidance by courts, sometimes seemingly to the point of evasion, of
sustaining the constitutionality of zoning solely on aesthetic grounds
has had its origin in a wholesome fear of allowing government to
trespass through aesthetics on the human personality."' 8 4 He further
asserted that
[t]he United States has drawn strength from differences among its
people in taste, experience, temperament, ideas, and ambitions as well
as from differences in race, national or religious background. Even
where the use of property is bizarre, unsuitable or obstreperous it is
not to be curtailed in the absence of overriding reasons of public
policy. 8 5
Judge Van Voorhis' concern for safeguarding human personality
and idiosyncrasy from regulatory aesthetic incursions is, if anything,
more applicable to first than to fourteenth amendment guarantees.
Suppose, in the post-Young judicial climate, Stover chose to hang signs
protesting high taxes from his clotheslines rather than underwear and
rags. Whether the courts chose Justice Powell's police-power supremacy
rationale or Justice Stevens' more capricious second-class speech dis-
tinction as the means of sustaining Rye's aesthetic ordinance, the dam-
age to first amendment guarantees would be equally great.
182. 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1963).
183. Id. at 470, 191 N.E.2d at 277, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 740.
184. Id. at 472, 191 N.E.2d at 278, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 742.
185. Id. (emphasis added).
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The author here suggests that only an explicit ranking of police
power objectives according to their urgency in the Van Voorhis sense
of "overriding reasons of public policy"'81 6 will permit a rational
choice between their various values and the value of free speech.
Popularity and urgency is a fair test for establishing a police-power-
objective hierarchy, since police power regulations are adopted by a
legislature accountable to the people.' 8s It is a most unfair barometer,
however, for ranking differing kinds of speech, the least popular of
which is usually in the greatest need of first amendment protection.
For the purpose of resolving first amendment constitutional chal-
lenges, the approach suggested here would establish a pecking order
among zoning objectives, with those having a strong consensus-
health, safety and morals-at the top of the list, and more subjective
and debatable general welfare objectives, including aesthetics, at the
bottom. Where the objective of land use regulation in curbing loca-
tional freedom is found within the health, safety and morals portion of
the police power rationale and represents a compelling public interest
-as did the adult use regulations in Young-it prevails over constitu-
tional claims of a fundamental right premised on the first amendment.
Such a close scrutiny approach, requiring the state to shbw a compelling
interest, would resolve the tension between police power and the first
amendment not on the basis of the character and content of the speech,
but rather on the basis of the object of police power exercise.
This seems infinitely preferable to Justice Stevens' choice of rank-
ing types of speech in order to resolve the tension in favor of Detroit's
exercise of police power,""8 an approach that risks loss of our right to
receive unpopular forms of communication.8 9 The Constitution makes
no distinction, based on content, in the degree of l&rotection to be
accorded differing forms of speech. Justice Powell's concurrence, on the
other hand, points the way to a resolution of the conflict between zon-
ing and speech even while failing to rank objectives of police power
exercise. His use of the close scrutiny test to reach this result does at
least suggest the importance of both the regulation and the speech. 90
Nevertheless, unless subsequent cases clarify and define the class of zon-
ing regulation which will be able to dominate protected speech (and
186. Id.
187. See note 150 supra.
188. See text acccompanying notes 24-28 supra.
189. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
190. See text accompanying notes 32-38 supra.
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ignore Stevens' second class speech doctrine as aberrational), Young
may well foreshadow an eclipse of first amendment protection of
unpopular expression brought about by zoning boards sensitive to
majoritarian views of the electorate.
CONCLUSION
Whether zoning obscenity will lead to the undermining of ra-
tionality in legislation, substituting therefore a notion of popular tra-
ditions as a mask for ignorance, "bigotry" and "intolerance,"' 91 re-
mains to be seen. The New York City experience reveals the pitfalls to
which the political process is prone in this context, and stands as a
stark example of the difficulties local governments may experience
in using the new police power sword forged by the Supreme Court.10 2
Well used, it promises to preserve the quality of life desired by resi-
dential and business communities while still allowing significant op-
portunities for adult speech. 193 Ill-used, it can prove to be a perilous
double-edged sword, smiting not only adult speech, but all diversity
and non-conformity found "incompatible"-read "threatening"-by
the zoning board and the body politic.
As more than one politician has learned, regulation of morals
is a prickly business, whether the means employed be zoning or ob-
scenity legislation. The ultimate question posed by commentators on
local obscenity laws and their implications for freedom can equally
be posed regarding local land use zoning enactments: "When our gov-
ernment posts guards among us to watch over our morals, we must ask
ourselves the question put to the Romans by Juvenal 2000 years ago-
'But who will guard the guards?' "'P,4
191. Richards, supra note 124, at 86.
192. 77% Favor City Zoning of X-Rated Shops: Poll, N.Y. Daily News, Feb. 22,
1977, at 31, col. 1; More on the Zone Defense Against Smut, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1977,
at 30, col. 6; The Zone Defense Against Smut, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1977, at 18, col. 5;
Zoning out the Porn, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1976, at 42, col. 1.
193. See text accompanying note 158 supra.





STATE STATUTES ENABLING LOcAumEs To
PROMOTE "MORALS" IN ZONING CODES
This table shows which state zoning enabling acts specifically authorize
political subdivisions to promote morals, and which do not. Even when a
statute does not mention morals as a valid zoning objective, however, state
courts may infer that localities have the authority to pursue that purpose in
their zoning codes. See, e.g., cases cited in note 167 supra.
Symbol Meaning
Y Statute mentions morals as a valid zoning objective.
N Statute authorizes the subdivision to zone its land,
but does not mention morals as an objective.
n/a Authority for the subdivision's zoning code is con-
tamined in another statute.
No state statute authorizes the subdivision to enact
a zoning code.
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